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The Coming Connected-Products Liability
Revolution
ROBERT S. PECK†
Technological innovation begets legal revolution. And tort law, as a creature of the common
law, makes the most profound doctrinal leaps and does so more rapidly than any other area
of law when technology changes our everyday lives to create new wrongs and demand
remedies. History demonstrates tort’s unique ability to respond to the newest technologies,
as it did with the appearance of railroads and later automobiles.
Today, once again, we are living in an age of great technological change, ushered in by
ubiquitous smart devices. Computers, connected to other computers through the Internet,
populate a wide variety of everyday items. Projections estimate that a trillion connected
computers will span the globe by 2035, linking everyday products, homes and buildings, and
even human bodies. Even today, computer connections revolutionized government services,
interpersonal communications, modern education, healthcare delivery, and business
relations. And, as with every previous major societal change, the law struggles to keep up.
Nowhere is that more evident than in the areas where duties and liability attach. Some of that
is a function of old concepts and doctrines continuing to hold sway, given the tradition-bound
and precedent-oriented nature of law. Yet, as with other liability-inhibiting doctrines, certain
existing liability rules that may have once made sense will require reexamination and,
perhaps, abandonment, as continued adherence to them becomes less a matter of considered
choice than blind allegiance to a world that no longer exists.
This Article argues that products liability will undergo revolutionary changes to address
liability and responsibility. It suggests that over-the-air updates, hidden technological
capabilities, and susceptibility to hacking will require new standards that require
manufacturer accountability that track reasonable consumer expectations. As a result, the
Article predicts that the relatively new emphasis on a risk-utility approach that imposes proof
of a reasonable alternative design will have a short shelf life because of the insensibility of
imposing on a plaintiff the need to examine and improve upon millions of lines of computer
code. It also suggests that what justice demands as a measurement of proximate cause will
also shift away from rigid standards to what a manufacturer knew or should have known,

† President, Center for Constitutional Litigation, P.C., Washington, D.C. An earlier version of this article
was presented at a symposium cosponsored by the Pound Civil Justice Institute and the UC Hastings Center for
Litigation and Courts, entitled “The Internet and the Law: Legal Challenges in the New Digital Age” in
November 2021.
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what it should have done, and when it should have done it. Moreover, personal jurisdiction
will require reexamination when the product through its connectivity with the manufacturer
for updates and real-time monitoring, as well as proprietary software it continues to own,
never actually leaves its maker’s remote but ever-present hands.
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INTRODUCTION
Technological innovation begets legal revolution. And tort law, perhaps
more than any other area of law, makes the most profound doctrinal leaps when
technology changes our everyday lives. There is no mystery to tort’s essential
importance as the law seeks to conform itself to modern realities. Tort, a creature
of the common law, addresses wrongs and remedies that people most typically
face. As those wrongs change, tort law requires constant adjustment and
retooling to address new conditions and ideas about justice and often does so
through law-making authority that resides largely in the courts, even when
informed by new statutes.1
Although the concept of tort, embodied in writs of trespass, dates back to
the thirteenth century2—and even medical malpractice had its origins in the
fourteenth century3—its development and growth proceeded at less than a snail’s
pace. By the time the twentieth century began, torts existed only as a “twig on
the great tree of law,” dismissively described as “totally insignificant.”4
Still, tort law was far from non-existent. Railroads, the advanced
technology that created a new era in the mid-nineteenth century,5 signaled an
importance to tort that only slowly revealed itself. Trains were “wild beasts” that
traversed the nation.6 For all that railroads contributed positively to economic
development, their powerful sweep across the landscape also killed livestock,
caused devastating fires, injured passengers, and destroyed much in their path,
including other trains.7 It is no hyperbole to say that “[r]ailroad law and tort law
grew up together” and were essentially one and the same.8
The Industrial Revolution further changed tort law from a sleepy backwater
of the law, even if it boasted some well-established doctrines and impressive
treatises,9 into a growing powerhouse needed to address the “marvelous
1. For a discussion of the common law of tort influencing the application of tort-oriented statutes, see
generally Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law in the Age of Statutes, 99 IOWA L. REV. 957 (2014).
2. Elizabeth Jean Dix, The Origins of the Action of Trespass on the Case, 46 YALE L.J. 1142, 1143 (1937).
3. See Weidrick v. Arnold, 835 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Ark. 1992) (citing WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
161 n.32 (4th ed. 1971), to recognize that medical malpractice “had its origins at common law” and that the first
recorded case occurred in 1374); see also Allan McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND.
L. REV. 549, 550 (1959) (identifying the same 1374 case).
4. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467 (2d ed. 1985).
5. See Donald G. Gifford, Technological Triggers to Tort Revolutions: Steam Locomotives, Autonomous
Vehicles, and Accident Compensation, 11 J. TORT L. 71, 87 (2018).
6. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 468.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. The first tort treatise appeared in 1859. THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF
TORT LAW 15 (2001). Perhaps no scholarly treatise achieved the same renown in the 19th century as THOMAS
M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT
(1888), in part due to its rejection of forms of action as the organizing principle for torts, in favor of a more
plaintiff-rights/defendant-misconduct approach. See Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, Conceptualizing
Tort Law: The Continuous (and Continuing) Struggle, 80 MD. L. REV. 293, 307 (2021). Presciently, Cooley
recognized that “new inventions and improvements . . . have a powerful tendency in the direction of creating
new wants and desires, and of establishing people in new occupations, and as these increase, the interests, desires
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capacity” its machines had “for smashing the human body.”10 Stringent rules
that blocked recovery required reconsideration and adjustment. Assumption of
risk and contributory negligence, for example, provided seemingly insuperable
barriers to liability. The harshness of these rules gave rise to the “last clear
chance” rule that imposed liability regardless of the risk assumed or the
plaintiff’s own negligence when the tortfeasor had a final opportunity to avoid
the injury.11 Even further down the road, contributory negligence was largely
replaced with comparative negligence.12
Once again, we are living in an age of great technological change, ushered
in by ubiquitous smart devices. In 2011, thirty-five percent of Americans owned
a smartphone.13 A decade later, that number has jumped to eighty-five percent,
with those aged eighteen to forty-nine having reached more than ninety-five
percent in smartphone usage.14 The trend toward youthful adoption suggests that
smartphones will continue to claim common adherence in all but the poorest and
least industrialized nations.

and passions of men must necessarily breed more frequent controversies.” COOLEY, supra note 9, at 1. Cooley
expressed doubt that the necessary “infinity of legislation” could keep up with “new conditions” but put his faith
in “judicial legislation,” his term for the common law, as a “necessary condition of any steady improvement in
the law.” Id. at 2, 11–12. Because so much of tort law is common law, the law, more generally, experienced that
steady improvement disproportionately through tort. In fact, even today, Marshall Shapo calls tort the
“quintessential common law subject.” Marshall S. Shapo, Millennial Torts, 33 Ga. L. Rev. 1021, 1021 (1999).
Tort became a law-school class separate from other subjects in 1870 and only subsequently came to be
considered “a discrete branch of law.” G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
3 (1980).
10. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 467.
11. WHITE, supra note 9, at 47.
12. Contributory negligence was a common-law doctrine developed in the early 19th century that barred
recovery if the plaintiff’s own negligence contributed in any way to the injury. 78 A.L.R.3d 339 (Originally
published in 1977). The harshness of that doctrine was recognized quickly, but largely survived into the 20th
century until the use of comparative negligence, which assigns percentages of fault, became the majority rule.
Still today, four states continue to employ contributory negligence. Peter Nash Swisher, Virginia Should Abolish
the Archaic Tort Defense of Contributory Negligence and Adopt A Comparative Negligence Defense in Its Place,
46 U. RICH. L. REV. 359, 360 (2011). Nonetheless, four states and the District of Columbia still utilize
contributory negligence to this day in negligence actions. See, e.g., Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hall, 681
So.2d 126, 130 (Ala. 1996) (holding that failure to instruct jury that contributory negligence was a defense
constituted reversible error); Asal v. Mina, 247 A.3d 260, 271 (D.C. 2021) (“In the District, a plaintiff in a
negligence action generally cannot recover when he or she is found to have been contributorily negligent.”);
Harrison v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 894, 905 (Md. 1983) (“All things considered, we are
unable to say that the circumstances of modern life have so changed as to render contributory negligence a
vestige of the past, no longer suitable to the needs of the people of Maryland.”); Proffitt v. Gosnell, 809 S.E.2d
200, 209 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (recognizing that failure to yield the right-of-way to a motor vehicle may
constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law); Rascher v. Friend, 689 S.E.2d 661, 664 (Va. 2010)
(recognizing that contributory negligence remains an affirmative defense).
13. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/factsheet/mobile/.
14. Id. Globally, more than half of the world’s 5 billion cellphone users have smartphones. Laura Silver,
Smartphone Ownership Is Growing Rapidly Around the World, but Not Always Equally, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb.
5, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/02/05/smartphone-ownership-is-growing-rapidly-aroundthe-world-but-not-always-equally/.
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Smartphones, though, are but the tip of the iceberg. Computers, connected
to other computers through the Internet, can be found in a wide variety of
everyday items. At least one projection estimates that “by 2035 the world will
have a trillion connected computers, built into everything from food packaging
to bridges and clothes.”15 These connections, known as the Internet of Things,
or IoT, enable communication between computers to assure efficiency and
convenience.16 As the ability to do so increases at the same time that costs
decrease, “[c]ountless tiny chips will be woven into buildings, cities, clothes and
human bodies, all linked by the internet.”17
The IoT has already touched nearly all aspects of everyday life. It has
revolutionized government services, interpersonal communications, modern
education, healthcare delivery, and business relations.18 And, as with every
previous major societal change, the law struggles to keep up. Nowhere is that
more evident than in the areas where duties and liability attach. Some of that is
a function of old concepts and doctrines continuing to hold sway, given the
tradition-bound and precedent-oriented nature of law. Yet, as with other
liability-inhibiting doctrines, certain existing liability rules that may have once
made sense will require reexamination and, perhaps, abandonment, as continued
adherence to them becomes less a matter of considered choice than blind
allegiance to a world that no longer exists.
Products liability provides helpful perspective on how law must adapt to
the changes of a society more connected than ever before through the Internet.
It raises challenges that have historical antecedents and others that require
reinvention. It also taps into the value of a common-law system capable, if
properly utilized, of advancing in tandem with rapidly progressing technology.
This paper attempts to sketch out some of the challenges and potential
doctrinal changes ahead, understanding that change occurs swiftly in ways that
we often cannot anticipate. One must always be mindful that many past
predictions about technology and its impact have demonstrated little prescience.

15. How the World Will Change as Computers Spread into Everyday Objects, ECONOMIST (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/09/12/how-the-world-will-change-as-computers-spread-intoeveryday-objects. In 2020, the number of IoT devices was 11.3 billion, despite slowdowns because of COVID19 and a shortage of computer chips. Satyajit Sinha, State of IoT 2021: Number of connected IoT devices growing
9% to 12.3 Billion Globally, Cellular IoT Now Surpassing 2 Billion, IOT ANALYTICS (Sept. 22, 2021), https://iotanalytics.com/number-connected-iot-devices/.
16. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD 5
(2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf.
17. Drastic Falls in Cost are Powering Another Computer Revolution, ECONOMIST (Sept. 14, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2019/09/12/drastic-falls-in-cost-are-powering-anothercomputer-revolution.
18. See Peter M. Lefkowitz, Making Sense of the Internet of Things, 59 BOS. BAR J., NO. 4, 2015, at 22.
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I. THE INADEQUATE STATE OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
While some products liability law sports a certain timeless quality that has
proven infinitely adaptable to more modern applications, other aspects of it seem
as antiquated as caveat emptor as a useful guiding principle for consumer rights.
At its most basic level, products liability law permits parties injured by defective
products to sue manufacturers and sellers for negligence, breach of warranty,
strict liability, or misrepresentation.19 The rationale behind products liability
contemplates that a manufacturer is in the best position to understand the risks
to a user that a product creates while marketing the item in a quest for profit,
thereby undertaking a duty to the product’s users.20
A. A SHORT HISTORY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Modern products liability owes its development to the arrival of new
technology, automobiles,21 and Benjamin Cardozo’s revolutionary opinion in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.22 To assess liability over a broken wheel due
to defective wooden spokes, MacPherson loosened the then-prevalent privity
rule to allow the injured plaintiff to sue the manufacturer directly, even though
the vehicle was purchased from an intermediary retailer so that the buyer had no
relationship with the manufacturer.23 Cardozo reasoned, in terms familiar today,
that the manufacturer should have discovered the wheel’s flaw upon reasonable
inspection and must take responsibility.24 Ever since, legal historian Lawrence
Friedman has described the evolution of products liability spawned by
MacPherson as a movement away from requirements of privity.25
It took nearly another thirty years after MacPherson for products liability
to develop further in a significant way. An exploding Coca-Cola bottle injured
the hand of a waitress who had just picked it up.26 She sued successfully based
on res ipsa loquitur even though the cause of the bottle’s shattering remained
unexplained,27 but a concurring opinion by California Justice Roger Traynor laid
the groundwork for strict liability. Traynor wrote that “it should now be
recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article that

19. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY §§ 1-2 (AM. L. INST. 1998).

20. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles,
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 430 (1993).
21. Automobiles have also had a profound effect on tort law outside of products liability. For a helpful
discussion of that development, see generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, When Cars Crash: The Automobile’s
Tort Law Legacy, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 293 (2018). An early observation of how “automobile law” had
grown quickly was written by then-student and later U.S. president Richard Nixon. See generally Richard M.
Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 476 (1936).
22. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
23. Id. at 1051.
24. Id.
25. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 356 (2002).
26. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 437–38 (Cal. 1944).
27. Id. at 440.
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he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings.”28 Proof of
negligence, he said, was unnecessary, had proven unworkable, and usually
spelled doom for an injured plaintiff.29 Traynor had to bide his time to see his
advocacy of doctrinal change implemented. That time came nearly two decades
later when he wrote the majority opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.,30 adopting the view he had expressed in 1944.
Soon afterwards, the American Law Institute (ALI) incorporated that view
into section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, guided to that result by
its reporter, William Prosser.31 Section 402A stated that a defendant should be
liable for selling “any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer.”32 That emerging principle is widely regarded as the
most important and most cited section of any Restatement produced by the
ALI.33 With the ALI’s endorsement of strict liability for product defects, courts
throughout the nation quickly adopted the approach,34 and products liability law
came into its own.
The growth of product liability in the aftermath of strict liability has
predictably produced a certain amount of retrenchment as manufacturers and
insurers have fought to limit their exposure and bring back concepts of
negligence.35 Much of the retrenchment took on life when then professor Guido
Calabresi suggested a seemingly neutral principle, the “cheapest cost avoider,”
as a guide to where liability should lie.36 Calabresi’s pioneering work led to the
law-and-economics school, which dominates doctrinal thinking today, “not only
in the legal academy but also in the decisions of influential state and federal
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court.”37 As recently as 2019, both the
majority and the dissent relied upon economic theory to assess, as a matter of
common law, the scope of the “duty to warn when the manufacturer’s product
requires incorporation of a part (here, asbestos) that the manufacturer knows is

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
Id. at 440–41 (Traynor, J., concurring).
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Design Liability: Farewell to Comment K,
67 BAYLOR L. REV. 521, 557 (2015).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965).
33. See James A. Henderson, Jr., A Proposed Revision of Section 402a of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1512 n.1 (1992).
34. David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG. 955, 977 (2007) (describing
Section 402A’s adoption as having “spread like wildfire from state to state, as one court after another, and an
occasional state legislature, ‘adopted’ the new doctrine”).
35. For a description of those changes, see Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort
Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 88–93
(2002).
36. Guido Calabresi, Changes for Automobile Claims? Views and Overviews, 1967 U. ILL. L. F. 600, 608.
This theory was spelled out more extensively in GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
37. Catherine M. Sharkey, Modern Tort Law: Preventing Harms, Not Recognizing Wrongs, 134 HARV. L.
REV. 1423, 1424 (2021) (book review).
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likely to make the integrated product dangerous for its intended uses.”38 The
majority concluded that the “product manufacturer will often be in a better
position than the parts manufacturer to warn of the danger from the integrated
product.”39 The dissent also took up the project, insisting that the after-product
component manufacturer “is in the best position to understand and warn users
about its risks; in the language of law and economics, those who make products
are generally the least-cost avoiders of their risks.”40
B. CONTEMPORARY PRODUCTS LIABILITY PRINCIPLES AND SOME
APPLICATIONS
Modern products liability law focuses heavily on the condition of a product
when it leaves the hands of the manufacturer or retailer without necessarily
ascribing responsibility to them for upgrades or responses to unanticipated
developments.41 The current Restatement classifies products liability into three
categories: manufacturing defects, design defects, and inadequate instructions
or warnings.42
Restatement (Third) also reformulated some key components of products
liability law. Most sweepingly, in design-defect cases, it jettisoned section 402A
strict liability and the consumer-expectations test,43 in favor of a “reasonable
alternative design” approach, imposing on plaintiffs an obligation to mount a
risk-utility case for why a different design approach would have been reasonable
and would not have substantially detracted from the products’ features.44 The
risk-utility test reintroduces negligence into products liability, and many states
have adopted it.45 Still, state courts are split on which test to apply and
sometimes even allow the plaintiff a choice between the two.46
The difficulty of using a reasonable alternative design test may be
exacerbated in the era of connected devices. When the product design issue
arises from miles of coding in a smart device, a demonstration of reasonable
alternative design could be particularly problematic, for it forces a plaintiff to
38. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 991 (2019).
39. Id. at 994.
40. Id. at 997 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
41. In Air & Liquid Sys., the majority emphasized that “[w]e do not purport to define the proper tort rule
outside of the maritime context.” Id. at 995. The dissent saw that statement as a “silver lining,” taking comfort
that a more restrictive liability principle would remain the law in tort generally, ascribing the majority’s maritime
generosity to maritime law’s special solicitude for the conditions that sailors face. See id. at 1000 (Gorsuch, J.
dissenting).
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 19.2 (AM. L. INST. 1998). Still, many
jurisdictions have rejected the reasonable alternative design approach.
43. Under the consumer-expectations test, liability hinges on whether the product “failed to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.”
Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 368 (Pa. 2014).
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1998).
45. See Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 990 N.E.2d 997, 1012 (Mass. 2013).
46. Clayton J. Masterman & W. Kip Viscusi, The Specific Consumer Expectations Test for Product
Defects, 95 IND. L. REV. 183, 191 (2020).
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produce experts that review the code and “fix” the software, an engineering feat
that seems beyond what may reasonably be required of an injured plaintiff.
Moreover, the product never really leaves the hands of the manufacturer but
continues to send data back to its originator while it receives updates in return
that frequently modify the product. The assumptions that undergird the riskutility approach, that assumes the design is complete when the manufacturer
relinquishes the product, seems off-kilter when the product remains connected
to its maker.
Another potential limitation on liability is the economic-loss doctrine,
which bars recovery for purely financial harms that do not involve injury to
person or property.47 It has proven to be an obstacle in some cybersecurity data
breach litigation and has faced calls for its revision.48
Proximate cause may also pose some challenges in products-liability
litigation. To the extent that smart devices are capable of being hacked or
otherwise fail due to atmospheric conditions, weak signals, or overwhelming
Internet traffic, questions may arise about whether the outside events were
foreseeable and redressable by the manufacturer. Yet, as more of those types of
events occur, foreseeability may become an easier question to answer.
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE AGE OF THE CONNECTED DEVICE
The distinguishing feature of today’s Internet-connected devices is a
continuing relationship between the product and the manufacturer. Just as
federal law requires a drug manufacturer to compile adverse incident reports and
change warning labels as new and unanticipated dangers are discovered,49
consumers’ expectations are high that manufacturers must produce software
updates, correct security holes in connected devices, have real-time information
about the devices from monitoring sensors that provide continuous data on the
device’s operation, and assure the connections essential to basic operations
through the Internet.50
Connected devices tout potential efficiencies otherwise unavailable. For
example:
Microchipped clothes could tell washing machines how to treat them. Smart
traffic systems will reduce waiting times at traffic lights and better distribute
cars through a city. Some will be the sorts of productivity improvements that
are the fundamental drivers of economic growth. Data from factory robots, for

47. Peter Benson, The Problem with Pure Economic Loss, 60 S.C. L. REV. 823, 823 (2009).
48. For a discussion of this issue, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Can Data Breach Claims Survive the
Economic Loss Rule?, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 339, 382 (2017).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 355(k); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 568 (2009) (describing the “changes being
effected” (CBE) regulation, 21 CFR §§ 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C)).
50. See generally CHRIS FOLK, DAN C. HURLEY, WESLEY K. KAPLOW & JAMES F. X. PAYNE, THE SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS (2015), www.afcea.org/committees/cyber/documents/
InternetofThingsFINAL.pdf.; Mauricio Paez & Kerianne Tobitsch, The Industrial Internet of Things: Risks,
Liabilities, and Emerging Legal Issues, 62 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 217, 220–25, 234–44 (2018).
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instance, will allow algorithms to predict when they will break down, and
schedule maintenance to ensure that does not happen. Implanted sensors will
spot early signs of illness in farm animals, and micromanage their feeding.51

Pampers, the disposable diaper brand, has incorporated sensors into a smart
diaper that connects to an app on a parent’s phone.52 A baby’s sleep patterns are
recorded and sent both to the app and to Pampers. It also alerts parents when the
diaper must be changed.53 Both daily and weekly “sleep insight reports” from
Pampers measure a baby’s progress and provide coaching on getting the baby to
sleep through the night.54
In addition, we have smart mattresses that boast sleep tracking capabilities,
as well as implanted medical devices that deliver medication when needed,
stimulate the heart, and monitor insulin levels.55 Automobile insurers encourage
drivers to use smart devices that allow the insurance company to monitor driving
habits and frequency to calculate risk and assess premiums.56
As welcome as some of the assistance offered by connected devices might
be, there are downsides that some consumers have already experienced. For
example, tractor manufacturer John Deere offers a high-end, advanced
technology tractor, which utilizes proprietary connected software that John
Deere licenses to purchasers.57 The software enables more efficient use of the
tractors, resulting in increased productivity, but also prevents farmers from
undertaking common repairs to the machinery themselves and has spawned a
right-to-repair movement.58 In late 2022, John Deere will offer a driverless
tractor model that uses GPS to steer and allows farmers to track the tractor’s
efforts on a smartphone app that will provide video and data.59 If the tractor
detects a problem it cannot solve, it will stop and send an alert to the farmer.60
A. INTERNET-CONNECTED PRODUCTS AND MALFUNCTIONS OR FAILURES
These changes in how manufacturers interact with products long after they
have left their hands implicates new duties and new potential liabilities. To
understand the continuing relationship between product and manufacturer,
consider, for example, Tesla’s reaction to Hurricane Dorian in 2019, when it
traveled along the Southeast coast of the United States after wreaking havoc in
51. Drastic Falls in Cost Are Powering Another Computer Revolution, supra note 17.
52. LUMI BY PAMPERS, https://www.lumibypampers.com/#how-it-works (last visited July 1, 2022).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See How the World Will Change as Computers Spread into Everyday Objects, supra note 15.
56. Id.
57. Peter Waldman & Lydia Mulvany, Farmers Fight John Deere Over Who Gets to Fix an $800,000
Tractor, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-03-05/farmers-fightjohn-deere-over-who-gets-to-fix-an-800-000-tractor.
58. Id.
59. John Deere’s Self-Driving Tractor, CNN (Jan. 4, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/04/tech/ces2022-tech-highlights/index.html.
60. Id.
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the Bahamas. To help his customers get away from the storm, owner Elon Musk
announced that some Tesla drivers would discover their electric vehicles boasted
an unexpected increased range.61 It turns out that even the most basic Teslas can
drive much further than the car’s specifications indicate because implanted
software lowers the range, apparently to encourage sales of their longer-range
option.62
Recognizing the danger to a customer trapped in a hurricane because the
battery charge gave out, Tesla, headquartered in Palo Alto, California, simply
removed the battery limitations at the “tap of a keyboard” and provided drivers
with “temporary access to the full power of their batteries.”63
But consider if Tesla had not done so. Tesla drivers might have been
stranded and injured in the storm because their vehicle lost power preventing
them from reaching safety. Or, the loss of precious time taken to recharge en
route, which was actually unnecessary, might support an argument that the
company had a duty to undertake the assistance that it actually provided in this
instance. That Tesla has now done so at least once suggests that customers may
have similar expectations when a future catastrophe occurs. A Tesla driver stuck
in dangerous circumstances might even call the company and ask for the same
range-enhancing treatment. If that assistance does not come to pass and injury
occurs, it is not difficult to imagine a case that argues in favor of a duty to assist,
as well as a defense about the driver’s own lack of foresight in fully charging
the vehicle before the emergency occurred.
In some ways, Tesla’s ability to enable longer drives for their vehicles
might be comparable to the complaints that exist when cellphone service
providers slow Internet speeds on their devices. When the customer has an
“unlimited” plan, some carriers will “throttle,” or slow the speed of the
connection, after customers hit a defined usage amount.64 In a crisis affecting a
portion of the country, when overwhelming cellphone usage could otherwise
jam networks, continued throttling could become a “but-for” cause of injury.
Other failures can occur when a manufacturer loses interest in the smart
product it once enthusiastically marketed. Microsoft, for example, after two
years in the ebook business, shut down its library in 2019, deleting all content
from the devices that customers used to read the books and thought that they had
purchased.65 The capability to delete remotely, even after the content had been
saved to a personal device, exists because a “digital media transaction is
61. How the World Will Change as Computers Spread into Everyday Objects, supra note 15.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. Rayna Hollander, The 4 Biggest US Wireless Carriers Are Reportedly Throttling Mobile Video Content
— Even When Networks Aren’t Congested, INSIDER (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/big-fourus-carries-are-throttling-mobile-video-streams-2019-8 (reporting on study by researchers at Northeastern
University and the University of Massachusetts Amherst).
65. Josh Axelrod and Lulu Garcia-Navarro, Microsoft Closes the Book on Its E-Library, Erasing All User
Content, NPR (July 7, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/07/739316746/microsoft-closes-the-book-on-its-elibrary-erasing-all-user-content. Microsoft refunded their customers payments to make up for the decision. Id.
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continuous, linking buyer and seller, and giving the seller post-transaction power
that would be impossible in physical markets.”66
Smart devices contain software that make the devices work. For the most
part, as in Microsoft ebooks, the John Deere connected tractors, and Tesla’s
battery capabilities, the software to run them is licensed to the consumer, rather
than purchased by them,67 giving the manufacturer continuing contact and
control over the device and making apparent that an operational device never
fully leaves the manufacturer’s hands.
That continuing connection is further demonstrated through software
updates that can improve the device’s functioning and provide updated security.
It often happens without the customer’s intervention, such as when a person
finds that Microsoft updated its Windows operating system on a personal
computer overnight, causing it to reboot unexpectedly.
Yet, what happens when the delivery system for a connected device fails?
Home security systems could leave a door or window open so an intruder may
enter; smart thermostats could go offline, resulting in a loss of heat and burst
water pipes;68 sprinkler systems could spray water inappropriately, creating
damage and mold in a home; or, an implanted medical device could under- or
over-deliver medication.69 Should liability attach? The answer may well depend
on how we approach proximate cause and the role we assign to foreseeability.
Where a manufacturer discovers a security hole or knows that its over-the-air
updates are glitchy but takes no steps to either warn customers or overcome the
obstacle, liability may attach. As is traditional in tort law, that means redefining
what constitutes a duty, as Justice Traynor did in developing the concept of strict
liability.
At the same time, the ongoing connection between the manufacturer and
the device, essential to its functioning, makes the actual discharge of that duty
relatively easy to accomplish. Yet, for a variety of unanticipated reasons, the
update may be delayed. Thus, capability and foresight may be critical
considerations. While programming errors probably provide no defense, lines
will need to be drawn about delays in software updates, understandings about
Internet traffic, and other malfunctions and failures—and perhaps warnings at
specific times, rather than through boilerplate disclaimers.

66. Aaron Perzanowski & Chris Jay Hoffnagle, What We Buy When We Buy Now, 165 U. PENN. L.
REV. 315, 318 (2017).
67. Id. at 318–21.
68. H. MICHAEL O’BRIEN, THE IMPACT OF THE SMART HOME REVOLUTION ON PRODUCT LIABILITY AND
FIRE CAUSE DETERMINATIONS, 2, 7 (2016), https://www.productliabilityadvocate.com/2016/09/the-refrigeratordid-it/.
69. See, e.g., Jones v. Medtronic, Inc., No. A17-1124, 2018 WL 1462169, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 26,
2018).
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B. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES, HACKING, AND OTHER CYBERSECURITY
BREACHES
If the “automobile accident is the bread and butter of tort law,”70 collisions
involving autonomous vehicles (AVs) may well provide the blueprint for much
of smart-device-related tort liability. Although many have treated the
manufacturer as the likely liable party when a fully autonomous motor vehicle
crashes, because the only conceivable driver is the car itself,71 even that situation
may require some rethinking to achieve that seemingly logical goal.
Early in the development of AVs, Volvo announced in grand fashion that
it would accept full liability for injuries and damage for its vehicles in
autonomous mode.72 Mercedes and Google (Waymo) joined that bandwagon.73
Tesla, a leader in the development of AVs, however, took a different stance,
emphasizing how its vehicles assist the driver, rather than constitute a
replacement.74 It explains that its “Autopilot is an advanced driver assistance
system that enhances safety and convenience” of the human driver, which, along
with “Full Self-Driving Capability,” is “intended for use with a fully attentive
driver, who has their hands on the wheel and is prepared to take over at any
moment.”75 The plain implication of these disclaimers is that Tesla declines to
be identified as the vehicle driver.
As one might expect, insurers, too, have an interest in who should be
considered the driver. One industry trade group, American Property Casualty
Insurance Association, contends that if the human drivers are not in control
because the vehicle is truly autonomous, insurers should have access to
information kept in an “event data recorder,” like an airplane’s black box,76 to
provide information about the vehicle’s speed and when the car’s sensors
became aware of the person or thing struck.77

70. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 684.
71. See, e.g., Alexander B. Lemann, Autonomous Vehicles, Technological Progress, and the Scope
Problem in Products Liability, 12 J. TORT L. 157, 212 (2019); see also Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for
Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF.
L. REV. 1611, 1619 (2017) (calling it a “the shared conclusion”).
72. Kirsten Korosec, Volvo CEO: We Will Accept All Liability When Our Cars Are in Autonomous Mode,
FORTUNE (Oct. 7, 2015), https://fortune.com/2015/10/07/volvo-liability-self-driving-cars/.
73. Bill Whitaker, Hands Off the Wheel, CBS NEWS (Oct. 4, 2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/selfdriving-cars-google-mercedes-benz-60-minutes/.
74. See Mike Ramsey, Who’s Responsible When a Driverless Car Crashes? Tesla’s Got an Idea, WALL
ST. J. (May 13, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tesla-electric-cars-soon-to-sport-autopilot-functions-suchas-passing-other-vehicles-1431532720 (“Hitting the turn signal not only tells the car it can pass, but also ensures
the driver has given thought to whether the maneuver is safe.”).
75. Support, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/support/autopilot (last visited July 1, 2022).
76. The Federal Aviation Administration requires aircraft used in transportation to comply with various
flight recorder and cockpit voice recorder requirements used to investigate the causes of crashes and popularly
known as black boxes. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.609 (2010).
77. Zoe Sagalow, Insurers Ask: Who Pays When Self-driving Vehicles Crash?, ROLL CALL (May 25, 2021),
https://rollcall.com/2021/05/25/insurers-ask-who-pays-when-self-driving-vehicles-crash/.
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Where the AV still requires human intervention, we may see an effort to
reinvigorate an assumption of the risk defense, even though it is disfavored in
the age of comparative negligence.78 Yet, even detailed disclosures of limitations
intended to serve as liability-forgiving disclaimers run counter to and inhibit the
marketing and promise of autonomous vehicles. When a person purchases a
vehicle with “Full Self-Driving Capability,” particularly when a showroom
salesman boasts of and demonstrates the no-hands convenience of the vehicle,
the disclaimer may well be ineffective—or should be.
Still, liability when the car operates as intended but still causes injury
cannot be discussed in isolation. As a type of connected device, AVs are subject
not just to updates and over-the-air improvements but to hacking and other
breaches. In the largest cyber hack ever, some 18,000 U.S. companies and
governmental agencies were hacked.79 It occurred because of code embedded in
a software patch automatically downloaded and installed on thousands of
computers through a tech company called SolarWinds, giving the hackers access
to the infiltrated computers and to the stored data on those computers. 80
In 2015, two researchers proved that they could hack a 2014 Jeep Cherokee
traveling on a public highway, taking control of its radio, windshield wipers, indash screen, and transmission, prompting Chrysler to recall 1.4 million cars to
enhance software security.81 Reports of the event prompted Chinese researchers
to hack a Tesla on an open road from twelve miles away and perform similar
control over the vehicle, just to show they could.82
These experiments suggest that a hack of AVs could have cars careening
out of control or cause massive traffic jams that impede essential services. A
recent report by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity found that the
use of artificial intelligence to improve cognitive functions in autonomous
vehicles are “highly vulnerable to a wide range of attacks that could compromise
the proper functioning of autonomous vehicles, and pose serious threats to the
safety of persons, both inside and outside of a vehicle.”83
Researchers at the RAND Corporation looked at potential civil liability in
connection with AVs afflicted by hacking and security holes and concluded:

78. The Restatement (Third) of Apportionment of Liability rejects a generalized assumption of risk
defense. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 cmts. e, i (AM. L. INST. 2000).
79. David E. Sanger, Nicole Perlroth and Eric Schmitt, Scope of Russian Hacking Becomes Clear: Multiple
U.S. Agencies Were Hit, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/us/politics/russiahack-nsa-homeland-security-pentagon.html.
80. Id.
81. Ryan J. Duplechin, The Emerging Intersection of Products Liability, Cybersecurity, and Autonomous
Vehicles, 85 TENN. L. REV. 803, 804, 814 (2018).
82. Id. at 814.
83. GEORGIA DEDE, ROSSEN NAYDENOV, APOSTOLOS MALATRAS, EURO. UNION AGENCY FOR CYBER
SEC’Y, RONAN HAMON, HENRIK JUNKLEWITZ & IGNACIO SANCHEZ, JOINT RSCH. CNTR., CYBERSECURITY
CHALLENGES IN THE UPTAKE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN AUTONOMOUS DRIVING 6 (2021),
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-jrc-cybersecurity-challenges-in-the-uptake-of-artificialintelligence-in-autonomous-driving/.
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AV manufacturers, component part makers, software designers, and
distributors “may face civil liability for the criminal hacks on AVs[;]” and, AV
owners themselves could also be open to liability for damage their vehicles cause
if they have rejected a security update.84
The researchers nonetheless expressed confidence that existing liability
law has the flexibility to adapt and manage small and medium hacks, and
assumed that criminal hacking is a foreseeable event, particularly where known
vulnerabilities exist.85 They also expect that the cases will require courts to use
cost-benefit analyses that will put a premium on judicial understanding of the
technology.86
Others to consider AVs have suggested that we could see a transition away
from individual ownership of vehicles and fleet liability, as well as a diminished
cost and need for personal automobile insurance.87 That, too, would change the
liability picture.
Scholars looking at liability issues for AVs have also lined up on opposing
sides of the consumer-expectation versus risk-utility approaches to liability,
much as states have.88 Professor Geistfeld, for example, has argued that an
“imperfect but safer [fully functioning] autonomous vehicle . . . will necessarily
drive in a reasonable, safe manner if prior driving experience shows that the
operating system at least halves the incidence of crashes relative to conventional
vehicles” and, under a risk-utility trade-off, should “satisfy the manufacturer’s
tort obligation.”89 Others find even that manufacturer-friendly formula too
onerous and have suggested dispensing with fault-oriented liability in favor of a
“manufacturer-financed, strict responsibility bodily injury compensation
system, administered by a fund created through assessments levied on HAV90
manufacturers.”91 Yet another scholar “concludes that the current product
liability regime, while imperfect, is probably compatible with the adoption of
automated driving systems.”92
What is missing, though, from these analyses is whether the continued
connection between product and manufacturer matters and revamps our notions
84. ZAV WINKELMAN, MAYA BUENAVENTURA, JAMES M. ANDERSON, NAHOM M. BEYENE, PAVAN
KATKAR & GREG BAUMANN, HACKED AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES: WHO MAY BE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES? AN
INITIAL INVESTIGATION INTO HOW CIVIL LIABILITY SYSTEMS CAN PREPARE 2 (2019),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10063.html.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Geistfeld, supra note 71, at 1614–16.
88. See notes 37–40 supra and accompanying text.
89. Geistfeld, supra note 71, at 1651.
90. HAV stands for “highly automated vehicles.” Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated
Vehicles and Manufacturer Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for A New Era, 105 VA. L.
REV. 127, 130 (2019).
91. Id. at 147; see also Kyle D. Logue, The Deterrence Case for Comprehensive Automaker Enterprise
Liability, 2019 J.L. & MOBILITY 1, 5; David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and
Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 129 n.39, 146–47 (2014).
92. Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving and Product Liability, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 2.
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of ownership. I would argue it does. The fact that the owner-manufacturer still
exercises a degree of control and, in some respects, has better information about
the connected device than does the owner-“operator,” suggests a different
paradigm.93 Conceived as a co-ownership relationship, liability should attach to
the owner in control. If operating autonomously, control rests with the
manufacturer while the co-owning individual has but a passive role in its
operation that is more akin to that of a passenger, rendering the manufacturer the
most responsible party for any crash—or at least jointly responsible.94
On the other hand, where the vehicle fails to perform as expected, solely
due to a defect in manufacturing or design, traditional principles that impose
manufacturer liability should still apply—even if the manufacturer can be
deemed a co-owner. That the cause of the vehicle’s failure was a foreseeable
security breach should not change that calculus. For those reasons, I suggest that
states adopt a strict-liability regime. Some scholars, recognizing the application
of ownership concepts for autonomous vehicles, appear to agree.95
To settle on the proper regime, whether a consumer-expectations or riskutility test should apply, a fundamental decision on the purpose served by tort
law must first be made. If it serves its traditional purpose of vindicating the
victim’s rights by providing compensation for the consequences of a
wrongdoer’s failure to discharge a duty, while operating “secondarily to confirm
and reinforce public standards of behavior[,]”96 then consumer expectations
provide the proper perspective. Such an approach is anchored in understandings
of tort law that date back to its earliest conceptions.97
At its most basic level, a reasonable consumer would expect an
autonomous vehicle to operate according to the rules of the road, so that it does
93. As just one example of how this plays out in cars, Tesla’s Autopilot system, which autonomously can
accelerate and brake while disclaiming that it is more than a driver assistance feature, has come under the review
of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) after 11 incidents in which its vehicles struck
parked fire trucks, police cruisers, and other emergency vehicles. In eight other collisions, 10 people died. After
Tesla added video games to its touchscreen display for passengers to play, NHTSA opened an investigation into
related safety concerns. A day after the investigation was announced, Tesla announced it was changing the
games’ software to prevent play while the vehicle was moving. See Neal E. Boudette, Tesla Agrees to Stop
Letting Drivers Play Video Games in Moving Cars, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/12/23/business/tesla-video-games.html. The report shows that, despite Tesla’s proclamation that Autopilot
should not be treated as autonomous driving, the system may still be responsible for control of the vehicle. It
also shows that Tesla has sufficient control that it is capable of modifying the purchased product in unexpected
ways to its operator, and thus maintains a type of control that does not exist with unconnected products. The
disabling of the video game feature also demonstrates knowledge that drivers, not just passengers, are likely to
engage in gameplay. Id.
94. Cf. 8 AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles § 613.
95. Sophia H. Duffy & Jamie P. Hopkins, Sit, Stay, Drive: The Future of Autonomous Car Liability,
16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 453, 453 (2013) (“The laws governing canine ownership show that applying strict
liability to autonomous car owners accomplishes the dual purpose of fairly assessing liability without hampering
the widespread adoption of this marvelous technology.”)
96. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 4 (2d ed. 2021).
97. See, e.g., FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS 72 (3d ed. 1866) (“The liability to make reparation
for an injury is said to rest upon an original moral duty, enjoined upon every person so as to conduct himself or
exercise his own rights as not to injure another.”) (footnote omitted).
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not precipitate a collision and reasonably averts those in which others might have
some fault.
On the other hand, a risk-utility approach that incorporates a reasonable
alternative design requirement sets too heavy a burden because it requires a
plaintiff to both determine the design flaw that caused the collision and develop
a safer design that would have worked better. An individual or a business,
injured by an AV, even employing an expert, lacks the means by which to
accomplish what an automotive company’s research and development
department evidently could not. Thus, giving way to what might be realistic, the
alternative reasonable-design approach cannot work without effectively
immunizing the manufacturer, regardless of what corners it may have cut.
That is not to say that risk-utility cannot play a role. If risk-utility is instead
defined in terms of who has the best opportunity to be the “cheapest cost
avoider,” the AV manufacturer stands firmly in those shoes. In that respect, the
consumer-expectations and lowest-cost-avoider tests converge. A manufacturer
exercising significant, if not total, control over the product reasonably should be
expected by the consumer and by economic theory to put a product on the road
that, represented as a completely autonomous vehicle, should be accountable
when it fails to perform in a safe manner and thus insure its safe operation.
C. THE RETAILER AND THE CONNECTED PRODUCT
Retailers have long shared liability with manufacturers,98 although some
states have enacted statutes that entitle an innocent seller to seek indemnity for
litigation costs from the manufacturer of a product alleged to be defective.99 Yet,
where the retailer assembled the item, implemented modifications, or kept an
independent connection to the product, even when coordinated or implemented
with the manufacturer’s consent or involvement, independent liability may
attach.100
Where, however, the retailer has no connection with the product that
duplicates, supplements, or displaces that of the manufacturer, liability ought to
still lie, but traditional concepts of indemnity should apply.101 In this respect, the
unconnected retailer requires no adjustment in traditional products liability.
D. A SHORT NOTE ON PROXIMATE CAUSE
Foreseeability has long served as the touchstone for proximate cause in tort
law and should remain a key factor in liability for injuries caused by connected
products. Proximate cause itself has a mercurial quality that defies easy

98. See Robert A. Sachs, Product Liability Reform and Seller Liability: A Proposal for Change,
55 BAYLOR L. REV. 1031, 1032–33 (2003).
99. See, e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 82.002(a).
100. See Sachs, supra note 98, at 1101–02 (listing statutes that treat a retailer as a manufacturer in some of
these circumstances).
101. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 76 (1937).
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definition.102 Even without the advent of connected devices and the forces that
could alter their operation, courts have found proximate cause “notoriously
confusing” and characterized by an utter “lack of consensus on any one
definition.”103
Generally, a proximate cause must only be “substantial enough and close
enough to the harm to be recognized by law, [and] a given proximate cause need
not be, and frequently is not, the exclusive proximate cause of harm.”104 It is a
tool used to eliminate liability for remote causes, meaning those “so attenuated
that the consequence is more aptly described as mere fortuity.”105 Whether an
intervening criminal event, such as hacking, breaks the causal chain and
becomes a superseding event, depends upon “whether the type of intervention
was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the product defect.”106 Still, there
is likely to be some fluidity for a time in what might be reasonably anticipated
and avoided as the capacity to do so evolves. The experiments in hacking AVs107
establish that hacking is foreseeable and frequently updated security measures
should be expected. The type of lag time that is reasonable between the
discovery of a security hole or flaw and its remedy will play out in expert
testimony.
Where a cause of action exists by statute, proximate-cause standards are
statute-specific,108 with more lenient requirements applied in some instances,109
and far more rigorously in others.110 Still, even in the statutory context, the
applicable proximate cause must be consonant with “what justice demands.”111
For connected devices, a rigid proximate cause standard will often mean
an assessment of what the manufacturer knew or should have known and what
it should have done and when it should have done it. Still, although significant
defects and insecure devices create obvious vulnerabilities to hacking,
reasonable efforts at plugging security holes can still prove ineffective. A
concept of what justice demands in such instances will need to be developed.
Because, in some ways, the manufacturer remains in possession of the device
through the software that it alone controls, a far more forgiving causal standard
seems apt that looks to a form of strict liability.

102. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 133 (2014).
103. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 701 (2011); see also W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS,
ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 263 (W. Page Keeton,
5th ed. 1984) (describing the disagreeing opinions as a “welter of confusion”).
104. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 704 (2004).
105. Paroline v. U.S., 572 U.S. 434, 445 (2014) (citation omitted).
106. DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1:16 (4th ed. 2014).
107. See notes 68–69 and accompanying text supra.
108. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 133 (2014).
109. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 701 (2011).
110. See, e.g., Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992).
111. Id. at 268.
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III. RETHINKING PERSONAL JURISDICTION FOR PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Most products liability cases take place in state court or federal courts
sitting in diversity. Modern personal-jurisdiction doctrine is less concerned
about haling a defendant into a jurisdiction unknown to it than about federalism
limits on a state’s authority to try a case.112 Today’s generally more restrictive
approach to personal jurisdiction is at odds with predictions the Supreme Court
ventured more than sixty years ago. In 1957, it assumed that “modern
transportation and communication” would continue the trend of “expanding the
permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other
nonresidents” in state courts as commercial transactions lead to a further
“nationalization of commerce.”113 Forty years later, a federal district court
predicted that the Internet, which “makes it possible to conduct business
throughout the world entirely from a desktop,” creates a “likelihood that
personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised [in direct proportion] to
the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the
Internet.”114
These predictions have not come to pass—yet. To date, personal
jurisdiction based on the Internet’s reach into a jurisdiction is a non-starter.115 A
manufacturer’s website is generally deemed a passively available way for a
customer to interact with a manufacturer. It therefore does not satisfy the
requirement that the relationship that conveys jurisdiction “must arise out of
contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State.”116 While the
website does not reach out to the customer, the manufacturer of a connected
device is repeatedly reaching out to the device, wherever located, and that action
changes the equation tremendously.
The Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on personal jurisdiction
appears to support that view. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial
District Court involved two cases about Ford vehicles not originally sold in the
states where the drivers lived and were injured.117 Ford resisted personal
jurisdiction, asserting that it could only be made to answer where the original
sale of the vehicle took place, where the car’s flawed feature was designed, or
where the vehicle had been manufactured.118 The Court rejected those
limitations, holding that “[w]hen a company like Ford serves a market for a

112. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780–81 (2017).
113. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957).
114. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123–24 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
115. See, e.g., Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 123 F. App’x 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he operation of the
website alone is insufficient to confer [personal] jurisdiction . . . .”).
116. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475
(1985)).
117. 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1022 (2021).
118. Id.
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product in a State and that product causes injury in the State to one of its
residents, the State’s courts may entertain the resulting suit.”119
Influential to its decision was the global reach of Ford’s business, where it
“markets, sells, and services its products across the United States and
overseas.”120 The Court pointedly noted that nearly all Ford dealerships provide
repair and maintenance services for the vehicles to assure they continue to
operate long after the sale.121 Ford also urges customers to “Keep Your Ford a
Ford,” and “provides original parts to auto supply stores and repair shops across
the country,” thereby “fostering an ongoing relationship between Ford and its
customers.”122 The Ford decision came after a decade of precedent that
continuously contracted the reach of personal jurisdiction.123 In a concurrence
joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch described those limitations as
“almost quaint” and certainly dated, suggesting an openness to rethinking
personal jurisdiction’s due process limitations.124
Connected devices may accelerate that rethinking. Their features satisfy
traditional considerations because the manufacturer continuously reaches out to
the device for data, provides updates, and usually owns the device’s embedded
software. Its “ongoing relationship,” to use Ford’s terminology, is directly with
the device and thus implicitly with the customer or user of the device. Its actions
initiate contact with the device, which may not be the type of purposeful
availment that has animated some personal-jurisdiction jurisprudence but still
provides the type of contact that a defendant initiates itself, irrespective of the
device’s geographic location.
The increasing presence of connected devices in the marketplace will no
doubt accelerate Ford’s recognition that judicial authority over persons outside
a geographically limited area is eminently fair and may yet render true the
Supreme Court’s 1957 prediction about how modern transportation and
communications will change the personal-jurisdiction calculus. As a result, a
vastly expanded personal-jurisdiction terrain appears likely.
CONCLUSION
Technology has long shaped the law of products liability, requiring it to
adjust to the realities of the types of products manufactured and what consumers
face in the marketplace. Connected devices open a new world to consumers and
will similarly require a re-conception of aspects of the applicable law.
Ownership of a connected device, as a functioning item, may no longer be
lodged solely in the purchaser, but shared with the manufacturer who maintains
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1023.
122. Id. at 1022–23.
123. See Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 70 FLA. L. REV. 499,
502–03 (2018).
124. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1034 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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proprietary software within the device. The relationship might not be accurately
characterized as manufacturer and customer, but as co-owners or service
provider and customer.
The manufacturer maintains frequent, if not continuous interaction with the
device, giving it a form of shared possession over the product. Preserving the
device’s usefulness through software and security updates, capturing real-time
data about its use and functioning, and conveying useful information to the
customer are central features of connected devices. The new relationship that
grows out of those attributes will necessarily impose new duties that, if not
discharged or if discharged negligently, will produce liability. To the extent that
consumers can expect to rely on those features, it may even bring a revitalization
and expansion of strict liability. Perhaps most inevitably, it will expand the reach
of personal jurisdiction in state courts. The result will not be evolutionary, but
revolutionary.

